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CYBERSPACE: THE CHALLENGES OF NORM 
FORMATION1 
 









The rules of appropriate conduct in cyberspace have always been a discussion throughout the various years, 
especially between States. With the rapid expansion of cyberspace, the creation of an international regime for 
the conduct of States became necessary, however, the many different vulnerabilities, actors, and even 
definitions made the consensus process difficult. The attributional question of cyberspace, however, was the 
question that most impeded the process. Technical advances in this area, along with the use of legal standards 
of proof made public attribution possible and more common. This paper seeks to investigate the link between 
public attribution with what is possibly an embryo of an international regime for cyberspace with a case study 
of NotPetya as emblematic of this trend.  
 





As regras de conduta apropriadas no ciberespaço sempre foram uma grande discussão ao longo dos anos, 
especialmente entre os Estados. A rápida expansão do ciberespaço tornou necessária a criação de um regime 
internacional para a conduta dos Estados, no entanto, as diversas vulnerabilidades existentes, atores e até 
definições diferentes dificultam o processo de consenso. A questão de atribuição de cyber incidentes, no 
entanto, era a questão que mais impedia o processo. Com avanços técnicos nesta área juntamente com a 
utilização de processos investigativos legais, atribuição pública está se tornando mais comum. Este estudo 
investiga a ligação entre atribuição pública e o que é possivelmente um novo regime no ciberespaço, utilizando 
um breve estudo de caso do NotPetya e como este é emblemático desta nova tendência. 
 





The natural progression of technology created an expansive and new area of research for the 
field of International Relations. Already in the 20th century, two new technologies came into 
existence that created large ripples in the study of security in the field, space, and nuclear technology. 
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compartilhamento com reconhecimento da autoria e publicação inicial nesta revista. 
2  Mestranda do Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de São Paulo (USP). E-mail: 
mariaclmnunes@gmail.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6892-1186. 
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The first lead to an explosion of debates over military and legal implications of the technology, while 
the second led to one of the most famous theories from Kenneth Waltz, that the greater diffusion of 
nuclear technology would mean greater safety (Sagan and Waltz, 1981). Now in the widespread 
implementation of the Internet of Things and on the cusp of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, 
security discussions regarding new technologies are needed along with new international norms over 
said technologies.  
With its commercialization, cyberspace has undergone a large expansion and refinement of 
its interconnectivity through the generations, leading to a natural evolution of security studies 
pertaining to it. The evolution of security studies would occur with a technological milestone or an 
international event in cyberspace, for example, the US Election Interference in 2016, would shift 
focus within the security studies field.  As part of this evolution, two distinct areas of studies have 
been identified that may cause great ambiguity in the field of security studies and policies that are 
applied to such a nascent, but domineering field. While both areas are described as cybersecurity 
politics, the different emphasis on the title will lead to disparate studies on the subject; one focusing 
on politics in cybersecurity and the other focusing on cybersecurity in politics (Cavelty and Wenger, 
2020). It is from this ambiguity that this paper aims to contribute to the study of security norms in 
cyberspace, and their creation.  
The necessity of governing norms in cyberspace has come from how these political influences 
are being utilized in cyberspace, along with small-scaled, but constant cases of cyberattacks. Yet, 
there is not a universal convention of social conduct norm in which all countries follow (Change and 
Grabosky, 2017), nor a framework which States can utilize as a precedent to react to cases of 
cyberattack and exertion of influence through cyberspace. The creation of such response framework 
and norm for social conduct becomes even more muddled and confusing when in research it has 
been acknowledged that States are not the only actors that influence the domain (Singer and 
Friedman, 2013; Change and Grabosky, 2017). This in turn has created various new dynamics that 
are prevalent in cyberspace, a melding of private companies, international organizations, and 
individual groups that meld together to create a kaleidoscope of dynamism that require negotiation 
amidst themselves and states for a system that, while resembles governance, does not set social 
conduct norms nor does it punish deviate behaviors online. 
This paper focuses on the governance of cyberspace and how attribution can be utilized as a 
method of setting social norms of acceptance of interstate behavior in cyberspace utilizing a 
previously established framework with few modifications to punish actions that certain destructive 
behaviors that State may engage in or not prevent. With public attribution becoming commonplace, 
the possibility of cyberspace norms being finally created becomes clearer. 
The current working paper is divided into four sections. The first one takes a brief look at the 
current problems in cyberspace governance that impede a norm. It problematizes the concept of 
cyberspace and how the construction of the domain creates hurdles in the creation of norms of 
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conduct within cyberspace. The second section looks at the securitization of the cyberspace domain. 
Utilizing the critical lens provided by Lobato and Kenkel (2015), the paper applies the logic of the 
Copenhagen school which places cyberspace as its own referent object, which actors securitize. The 
third section analyzes the effectiveness of proposed frameworks to deal with cyberattacks that 
operate within cyberspace and the possible responses that States may have. The final section 
discusses the case of NotPetya, contrasting them with the evidence from Crain and Nadler (2019) 
where the internet advertising infrastructure can be used as a tool for power plays.  
 
 
2. THE GOVERNANCE OF CYBERSPACE 
 
The existence of cyberspace as a domain that transcends physical borders, occupying both a 
tangible and intangible existence. Peculiarities of its existence tend to create hurdles for a governance 
system to be created for the domain, in other words, a singular institution that can implement social 
conduct laws within this domain. Among these peculiarities, we find the architecture of cyberspace, 
actors, and the definitions therein to be the most problematic in the case of norm creation and 
application.   
Fundamentally, cyberspace is understood to be an artificial domain created by humans, 
which occupies an existence that sits on deterritoriality and territoriality. As explained in Medeiros 
and Goldoni (2020), the nature of cyberspace does more than cross borders, but also anchors such 
to a physical territory through the equipment used to access the infoways. It is a full domain that 
encompasses the traditional domains, penetrating them through interconnected informational 
flows, and challenging the zonal conception of territory. This challenge doesn’t go unnoticed and 
actually brings a host of problems in terms of jurisdiction. The interconnection makes it hard to 
enforce laws over certain activities that, while may be legal in certain states, are illegal in others 
(Singer and Friedman, 2014), as well as the applicability of copyright laws that may not be exercised 
depending on the physical location of the servers of where the content is hosted3. Henceforth, there 
have been several attempts at harmonizing criminal and procedural national cyberspace laws, none 
have ever definitely solved this territorial conundrum. 
There have been two attempts notable multilateral attempts to solve this issue of 
territoriality, the first one being the Convention of Budapest of 2004 while the second attempt has 
been the Tallin Manual of 2013. However, these two attempts have not been able to give closure to 
the issue of territoriality and have rather limited applicability. The Convention of Budapest failed on 
the principle that it has a very limited scope as it deals in principle only with the occurrence of 
 
3 One example would be the case of the application of Japan’s Copyright Act of 1970 in videos on YouTube, in 
which the servers are in the United States. Due to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, in which 
YouTube functions under the laws of Fair Use from the United States apply to media from Japan that are used 
in transformative works hosted in YouTube servers. 
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cybercrimes, notwithstanding, the small number of countries that ratified the convention along with 
missing key players such as China, India, and Brazil limit the applicability of the treatise cyberspace 
(Chang and Grabosky, 2017). As an attempt to harmonize the definition and criminal offense of 
cybercrimes there are a few factors that may have induced the failure of the convention overall. One 
of the main concerns is the general lack of a common definition that is agreed on by different 
countries. This can be verified when looking at the definition of cyberwarfare between, for example, 
the United States and Russia, in which for the former the definition of cyberwarfare characterizes it 
as “cyberattacks that are authorized by state actors against cybernetic infrastructure in conjunction 
to a government campaign” (Giles and Hagestad II, 2013, p. 4), while the latter defines cyberspace 
warfare as “cyberattacks done by States, groups of States, or politically organized groups against 
cyberspace infrastructure, all part of a military campaign” (Giles and Hagestad II, 2013, p. 4). Both 
definitions present similarities, however, the nuance between the difference of government 
campaign and military campaign, along with the definition that excludes military political 
organizations brings a problem with cyber incidents with the participation of non-state actors (Giles 
and Hagstad II, 2013). 
A similar issue occurs when one would look at the second attempt at creating a codified norm 
through the Tallin Manual. Officially, it never presented itself as a document to act as a codifying law 
or a norm. Instead, it sought to present itself as a framework which states could utilize in order to 
deliberate over cybernetic incidents and decide if legal action is necessary and which legal action it 
would take. Unlike the Convention of Budapest, however, the scope of the Tallin Manual is much 
narrower, focusing on the incident that would be jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles (Schmidt, 
2013). Activities that fall under the criminal umbrella are not dealt with in the Tallin Manual, instead, 
an almost exclusive focus is given to activities that deal kinetic damage, as pointed in Section 1, article 
1, ¶ 6: “The International Group of Experts could achieve no consensus as to whether the placement 
of malware that causes no physical damage (as with malware used to monitor activities) constitutes 
a violation of sovereignty” (Schmidt, 2013, p. 16). 
Both the Convention and the Tallin Manual, while prolific attempt to establish international 
norms within cyberspace, they have not been able to accomplish much. Lack of a traditional zonal 
territoriality (Medeiros and Goldoni, 2020) tied together with the lack of a common vocabulary 
(Giles and Hagestad II, 2013) creates an environment where public attribution becomes a prime 
method, which create norms of conduct in cyberspace and, at the same time, can be debatable and 
contestable in the international arena (Egloff, 2020). In addition to these two points, there are 
structural factors that create suspicion within public attributions such as economic and political 
incentives from both State and non-State actors that further muddle the water of what is acceptable 
or not within cyberspace (Cavelty and Wenger, 2020; Egloff, 2020).  
However, this does not mean that there are not any existing structures that constrain states 
or non-state actors within cyberspace. There is an order that exists within the domain. It is comprised 
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of an amalgamation of decentralized informal institutions that fit together like a mosaic to regulate 
it along with State institutions, governments frame these informal institutions together. These 
governmental frameworks are then joined together as varying governing norms that are joined and 
fit together, but there is not a solid framework that ties all together neatly4. Nevertheless, without a 
global institution that a universal consensus and rules, attribution in cyberspace will inevitably have 
politically uncertain gains due to various intrinsic factors within the domain (Egloff, 2020). It is 




3. SECURITIZATION OF CYBERSPACE 
 
Security threats, according to the Copenhagen School, are constructed through speech, where 
a certain object, called the referent object, is deemed to be above what is considered to be above 
normal politics (Buzan et. al., 1998). The theory as a post-structuralist theory in order to broaden 
the scope of what was considered to be a security threat and explain the various dynamics therein 
the various sectors it proposed. Later, the framework was expanded beyond the original sectors in 
order to capture the unique dynamics within cyberspace (Hansen and Nissebaum, 2009) and 
expanding the securitizing actors beyond the State, including actors such as think tanks, giving 
plausibility for private agents to become securitizing actors themselves (Lobato and Kenkel, 2015). 
This paper argues, then, that the securitization of cyberspace has contributed to the creation 
of structures that are hurdles to the creation of global cyberspace norms, all the while, also creating 
a division between knowledgeable cyberspace professionals lined by good and bad science (Lobato 
and Kenkel, 2015; Tanczer, 2020). 
Starting with the structure, it must be understood that the dynamics that are present in 
cyberspace are understood to be the result of the securitization of cyberspace. Precisely speaking, 
with networks themselves as the referent object, allows multiple actors to become both victims and 
perpetrators of the cyberattacks from a host of different types of attacks (Lobato and Kenkel, 2015).  
The dynamics within cyberspace have been identified: Code Regulation, Self-Regulation, and 
Distributed Security. Each of these dynamics operates in a different manner that converges formal 
regulation as well as informal regulating bodies in differing proportionality. The first of these, and 
most formal of the three, code regulation, postulates that the very architecture of cyberspace space 
is formally regulated by governments thusly forcing technology companies to adequate themselves 
to formal rules in order to function (Chang and Grabosky, 2017). In this instance, governments 
 
4 There are bilateral and multilateral agreements that bind national state institutions together that lead to 
various governing norms to be stitched together. However, this does not mean there is one uniform norm that 
can be fully applied as there are more actors than states that act within cyberspace. 
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become the securitizing actor, thusly, applying certain rules as an effort to reduce the vulnerabilities 
by adjusting the very code foundation that cyberspace is inserted within. However, as an effect of 
this regulation, the issue of cyberspace freedom and anonymity comes into play (Chang and 
Grabosky, 2017), again, as a result of securitizing speech that has led, in some States, a creeping 
militarization of cyberspace such as the United States (Lobato and Kenkel, 2015) and China. Within 
the second dynamic cited, self-regulation has the market as an informal regulator, though 
governments may provide legitimacy to certain institutions to enforce mandates (Chang and 
Grabosky, 2017). It is within this dynamic that we find a greater amount of division within the 
professionals of cybersecurity between different categories, constructing almost an in-group and 
out-group perception of those that are hackers and employ such tactics in favor and against private 
entities. These perceptions on hackers and their identity also create a microcosm of what are 
acceptable practices and behaviors within the field (Tanczer, 2020), which can influence the self-
regulation itself. The last of the dynamics explored is the distributed security, where the burden of 
security is distributed among various actors in the sphere, allowing for the sharing of information to 
bolster informational security, relying both on government, private sector, and active users as a 
source of policing (Chang and Grabosky, 2017). Proposals of a distributed security system dynamic 
build upon the notion that the entire network needs to be securitized (Lobato and Kenkel, 2015) by 
creating speeches over the need to impose certain habits upon users interconnected in cyberspace or 
software in order to increase security within the network and quarantine any cyberattack outbreak 
(Chang and Grabosky, 2017). 
These dynamics are an effective way to look to cyberspace and the myriad of ways that 
security can be established. There is not one dynamic that predominates the cyberspace domain, 
however, the effects that these kinds of dynamics have are reflected in a structure that creates an 
arena in which public attribution, though technically feasible, is often contested (Egloff, 2020). 
Within the securitized domain of cyberspace, the threat of the exploitation of vulnerability (Lobato 
and Kenkel, 2015) creates a structure of incentives towards private companies (Chang and 
Grasbosky, 2017; Egloff, 2020) that muddles the water. As explained by Egloff (2020), private 
companies, especially cybersecurity companies, have economic and political incentives to provide, 
or withhold, information to governments that may utilize this information to create a public 
attribution claim. Some private companies may elect to keep breaches of security a secret in order to 
keep themselves from being punished by governments (Chang and Grasbosky, 2017) or from 
inspiring copycat incidents (Singer and Friedman, 2014; Egloff, 2020), yet other companies, 
particularly cybersecurity companies, may want to advertise their expertise by publishing technical 
information (Egloff, 2020). Political biases also fall in line with incentives that these companies may 
have as Western-based companies tend to not divulge information on Western activities (Egloff, 
2020). Additionally, with the various existing actors in cyberspace that may perpetrate cyberattacks 
in the domain (Singer and Friedman, 2014; Egloff, 2020), securitization speech, that is embedded 
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within public attribution, may serve as incentives for governments to covertly align themselves to 
traditionally marginalized hacking communities in order to deflect any blame that may arise from 
public attribution despite the fact that there are hackers that are in government or private company 
employ (Tanczer, 2020). 
 
 
4. STRUCTURE OF ANALYSIS FOR THE ATTRIBUTION OF CYBER INCIDENTS 
 
In regard to cyberspace itself, interconnectivity and its expansion did not encompass solely 
the informational sphere with information sharing being done promptly, as it has started to 
encompass other spheres of society such as the political and economic sphere (Cavelty and Wenger, 
2020). Though this technological process has been beneficial to many states and their development, 
society has become vulnerable in these same areas. With critical infrastructure and the economy 
becoming more interconnected, the sharing of source codes between State and private companies 
make these same vulnerabilities more dangerous as time goes by. Since if a vulnerability is taken 
advantage of, the harm to a system network would be incredibly widespread (Chang and Grabosky, 
2017; Stevens, 2012). 
This spread of cyberspace into different spheres prompted States to look at cyberspace as a 
case of national security, with perhaps the most prominent of which is the United States. The study 
of such space has led to the attempted creation of a framework, though there are a few criticisms to 
utilizing a military mindset when engaging within the domain to create such a framework (Kallberg 
and Cook, 2017). Nevertheless, the discussion of a possible framework is important when it comes 
to setting the standard to how cyberincidents can be evaluated. Without a framework, case studies, 
such as NotPetya, Sony Entertainment, and the case of the 2016 Democratic Committee (Egloff, 
2020), would seem to have been punctuated by irrational State behavior. Yet, coming from the 
principle that States are rational actors, one needs to have a framework in order to evaluate possible 
actions that States will take.   
A principal question about the framework utilized would be regarding the translation of the 
traditional military tenets into the domain, which has been largely criticized for being largely 
outdated and woefully inefficient for the challenges that the domain holds (Kallberg and Cook, 2017). 
However, a framework has been developed that does employ a different methodological tool in order 
to deal with the unique challenges that comes from the domain, among which consist of subjective 
analysis that comes from legal processes (Mejia, 2014). Consisting of two vertices, the proposed 
analytical framework orients the incident on a scale of damage and perpetrator identification (Mejia, 
2014), two tenets that have been criticized largely for a lack of effective measurement and anonymity 
(Kallberg and Cook, 2017). 
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The vertex that scales the severity of damage taken by a State measures the possibility of a 
retaliatory act against a possible perpetrator. Public norms regarding retaliation have been codified 
into international law with the statement that States may only use force in self-defense5. Criticism in 
regard to the severity of the attack often states the attackers do not know the scale of damage that an 
attack may have against an enemy network upon execution (Kallberg and Cook, 2017). There is a lag 
of time between the execution of a cyberattack and the investigation on the damages caused, creating 
difficulties in assessing what would be the proportionality of an attack. By the rules set forth by the 
Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC)6, a retaliatory attack is only permissible if it manages to cause the 
same damage that a victim State received (Mejia, 2014; Singer and Friedman, 2014). Factoring the 
interconnection between civilian, State, and military infrastructure, the permission of retaliation 
becomes a delicate legal question (Mejia, 2014; Singer and Friedman, 2014; Hieginbotham et. al. 
Chang and Grabosky, 2017) as spillover damage from cyberattack may escalate to kinetic attacks 
(Stevens, 2012; Mejia, 2014; Heginbotham et. al., 2015). 
The legal question presented, however, is solved by the application of the Article 52 (2) of the 
Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention7 by a victim State, as it is stated within the article itself 
that if the targeted object constitutes itself as giving military advantage, it is then an object that can 
be legally destroyed, either partially or totally (Mejia, 2014). While there is a great systemic lag for 
the case of a retaliatory attack, as attacks are considered to be executed at a computational speed 
while defensive strategies take time to create and execute (Kallberg and Cook, 2017), it is not a defect, 
but rather a feature. The time that is necessary to create a strategy creates two advantages for a 
dynamic framework: a) it permits the deliberation of alternatives to a retaliatory strike, such as 
diplomatic pressure or strengthening of defensive systems or b) permits the victim State to retaliate 
in a limited manner that does not create spillovers.  
The most emblematic case of the latter option is the case of Stuxnet. It was not a retaliatory 
strike, however, the development and specificity of the worm’s coding permitted it to affect only one 
specific system without generating damage to other systems not specified in the code (Porche III, 
Sollinger, McKay, 2011). As a result of this very specific coding, if an infected system didn’t have the 
target program specified in Stuxnet’s code, the worm would become inert. Additionally, the worm 
had a code line of self-destruction that would become active after a certain date and after the limit 
number of infections was hit (Singer and Friedman, 2014). The success of the Stuxnet demonstrates 
that it is possible, with given time, to create a retaliatory cyberweapon that targets only military 
systems while leaving civilian networks relatively unscathed. Therefore, it is possible to follow the 
 
5 See: CHARTER of the United Nations. 1945. Available in: https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml . 
6 This law, also known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict 
due to humanitarian concerns. 
7 Article 52 (2) of the Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention delimits military objectives as objects that 
their nature, objective, or use effectively contributes to military actions where a total or partial destruction, 
capture, or neutralization in the circumstances of the retaliation defines itself as a military advantage.  
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proportionality clause of the Law of Armed Conflict, however, it does call into question the costs and 
benefits of such actions like Stuxnet8. In this same vertex, the severity is examined in order to find if 
the LOAC is applicable to the situation, to which six criteria9 exist: severity, immediacy, directness, 
invasiveness, measurability, and presumptive legitimacy. When these six criteria are applied to a 
cyber incident, it may help the Statist to determine if the incident is equivalent to a traditional kinetic 
attack and if a retaliation is both necessary and permissible through the LOAC (Mejia, 2014).   
The second vertex of this analysis framework concerns actor attribution. One of the main 
issues of the domain, it is generally accepted as being extremely difficult for one State to make a 
public attribution as the participation in this domain is not restricted to States, but rather, non-state 
actors as well (Singer and Friedman, 2014). Tools also exist that can be employed to mask the 
network trail that can lead to the culprit. The typical method of tracking culprits, IP tracing, can be 
easily bypassed by the use of IP address spoofing (Mejia, 2014; Chang and Grabosky, 2017), which 
leads to the assumed difficulty in attribution (Singer and Friedman, 2014). However, the technical 
difficulty in full attribution to a State is mitigated by political-analytical frameworks that have been 
discussed by a few authors (Healy, 2013; Mejia, 2014; Cavelty et. al., 2015). However, by utilizing the 
subjective political-analytical nature of the cyber incidents, actor attribution can still be linked 
towards a state, whether or not the incidents were caused by agents of the State according to the 
framework.  
A political-analytical framework regarding actor attribution remains one of the most 
important points of the process for the analysis of cyber incidents. A technical proof will never 
provide complete and irrefutable proof due to the asymmetrical information structure that exists 
(Egloff, 2020), henceforth requiring a more holistic approach that is provided by different fields such 
as the legal profession and law enforcement (Mejia, 2014). This falls in line with not exploring which 
specific actor caused the incident, but rather, which State is responsible for it (Healy, 2013; Mejia, 
2014; Cavelty et. al., 2015). Within such framework, there are two types of attribution that exist: 
direct attribution10 or indirect attribution11, which is further reinforced when taking into account 
fourteen analytical points that reinforce the holistic nature of the legal standard practice. 
The fourteen points are as follow: tracing to a nation, tracing to a state organization, attacks 
written or coordinated in national language, state control over the Internet, technical sophistication, 
little societal anger at target, no direct commercial benefit, direct state support of hackers, strong 
 
8 Although the costs and benefits of a cyberweapon does not factor into the scope of this paper, Max Smeets 
has written about this subject in a blog post in the Council of Foreign Relations (2016) and while not directly 
relating the costs of cyberweapon creation, C. Easttom (2018) explores the process of creation of such weapons 
though also relating that Stuxnet was technically an operational failure. 
9 These criteria are part of the Schmitt model, as proposed by Michael N. Schmitt professor of international 
law at the University of Reading. 
10 Direct attribution would be the States are responsible for actors or omission of individuals exercising the 
state’s machinery of power and authority even if the acts exceed the authority granted by the (Mejia, 2014). 
11 Indirect attributions are acts or omissions of non-state actors that are attributable to the state if the state 
fails to exercise due diligence in preventing or reacting to such acts or omissions (Mejia, 2014).  
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correlation with statements from national leadership, lack of openness and cooperation, strong 
correlation with national policy, lack of any other nation or group that benefits or correlated or 
integrated with physical force (Healy, 2013). These points, coupled together with the legal practice 
of standards of proof, bypasses the need for irrefutable technical proof (Mejia, 2014) as due to the 
political structure and lack of international normative practices leads to cases where the technical 
proof might be contested, such with the case of Sony Entertainment Pictures in 2014, and the DNC 
in 2016 (Egloff, 2020). Henceforth, one does not seek to attribute the cyber incident to an actor, but 
instead seeks to attribute responsibility to a State, that falls in the spectrum going from direct aiding 
or gross negligence.  
 
TABLE I – SPECTRUM OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
Type of Stance Government Influence Level 
State-prohibited The national government will help stop the third-
party 
State-prohibited-but-inadequate The national government is cooperative but unable 
to stop the third-party attack 
State-ignored The national government knows about the third-
party attacks but is unwilling to take any action 
State-encouraged Third parties’ control and conduct the attack, but the 
national government encourages them as a matter of 
policy 
State-shaped Third parties control and conduct the attack, but the 
state provides some support 
State-coordinated The government coordinates third-party attackers, 
such as by “suggesting” operational details 
State-ordered The state directs third-party proxies to conduct the 
attack on is behalf 
Rogue-state-conducted Out-of-control elements of cyber forces of the state 
conduct the attack 
State-executed The state conducts the attack using cyber forces 
under their direct control 
State-integrated The state attacks using integrated third-party 
proxies and its own cyber forces 
Source: HEALY (2013). 
  
All of this comes together in the framework in order to create a solid analytical case-by-case 
study of cyber incidents and the most appropriate responses to them that States might have. In the 
framework, this is represented by the quadrants in which the vertices of Act Attribution and Actor 
Attribution intersect. While originally proposed by Colonel Mejia utilizing only the Schmitt Model in 
the Actor Attribution vertex, the author of this paper modifies the framework and adds the fourteen 
points as described by Healy as a complement for the vertex of Actor Attribution. The second figure 
illustrates the modified model, along with the suggested actions for each quadrant.   
Even with this framework, there are aspects to it that will come under valid criticism due to 
the nature of cyber incidents. Unlike case studies, cyber incidents are dynamic, in other words, they 
do not remain static with one appropriate response. As the investigation of a cyber incident goes on 
and as more information is revealed, the appropriate response to a cyber incident might change 
Leal Nunes  Cyberspace: the challenges of norm formation 
Revista Conjuntura Global  v. 10, n. 1 (2021) 188 
(Mejia, 2014). This may in part explain delays in responses of cyber incidents, that the more 
thorough the analysis of a case is the slower the response to the incident will be. In turn, this might 
damage the case of public attribution. 
Another criticism that can be made of the framework model is how the responses are framed 
inside of the model. What is proposed of the model is to limit the severity of responses accordingly 
to the cyber incident, however, there might be less severe responses that are not listed in the 
framework that might be used. The framework is not a formula that will predict with full accuracy of 
how a State will act in response to a cyber incident as not necessarily a State will have to take one of 
the actions described in it (Mejia, 2014). The unique dynamics of cyberspace are captured by this 
very framework. As discussed in the third section of this paper, the securitization process of 
cyberspace, with networks as the referent objects, permits private actors, such as think tanks and 
individuals to be a victim as well as perpetrators of different types of attacks in this space (Lobato 
and Kenkel, 2015), however, States, have a privileged position in setting the security agenda overall 
due to being historically endowed for this purpose (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). As a result of 
this privilege, it endows States with the possibility of utilizing public attribution as a form of 
securitizing speech, and it is this securitizing speech that inevitably underlies this framework that 
presents an ambiguity. It reinforces a structure that widens a gap of information asymmetry, yet at 
the same time, public attribution as a form of securitizing speech sets a precedent to what is 
considered acceptable or not acceptable in cyberspace. It is the framework of this section, with its 
underlying securitized understanding of cyberspace, that allows States to perform public attribution 
with incremental political gains that set the groundwork for a future cyberspace norm. 
 
FIGURE I – MODIFIED ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR ATTRIBUTION 
 
Source: Mejia (2014). 
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5. ATTRIBUTION AND ITS NORMATIVE FUNCTION 
 
Public attribution has become more common despite the lasting belief that technical 
difficulties make attribution an almost herculean and impossible task (Egloff, 2020). In some of the 
most notorious cases of public attribution, the international community as a whole has had different 
reactions, with some being contested12 , and others generating discourse 13  and others have had 
support when there was a public attribution 14 . The very technical impossibility of irrefutable 
certainty of attribution of cyber incidents (Mejia, 2014), creates the political structural factors that 
cause distortions of public perception. Notwithstanding the incentives extrapolated in previous 
sections of this paper of private companies hiding the existence of a cyber incident, security 
companies, while willing to release public information on cyber incidents, have their own set of 
incentives that distort the viewing of the cases of public attribution. 
The first of these incentives are for security companies to not investigate all cyber incidents 
that occur. The reason is due not only political, as the governments often contract these companies 
to investigate cyber incidents, but also economical as cybersecurity companies will seek out only a 
limited number of cyber incidents to investigate in order to gain visibility and demonstrate their 
expertise (Egloff, 2020). The second incentives are the very asymmetric press released that 
contribute to the first incentive. The scope of which cybersecurity companies can publish their 
technical findings is small (Egloff, 2020), nor can the companies fully disclose all the information as 
it may showcase system vulnerabilities, as it may lead to the aforementioned copycat cases 
mentioned previously in the paper. The little amount of information that can be fully divulged as 
well as the small scope of cyber incidents that cybersecurity companies are willing to investigate and 
be contracted under, leads to a skewed public perception of public attribution cases (Egloff, 2020). 
This skewed perception of public attribution is a hindrance to norm creation in regard to cyberspace, 
however, this paper argues that this is only the case as the general analysis of cyber incidents for 
many years since its inception has been based upon only utilizing technical data as proof of guilt. The 
recent waves of public attribution have started to shift from the sole release of technical proof to a 
more holistic approach that involves the standards of proof from the legal profession. 
The NotPetya case would be emblematic of this turning point as well as the major case study 
of the paper’s final section. In 2017, an extremely destructive worm named NotPetya attacked several 
businesses under the guise of a cybercriminal ransomware. The worm, however, was not a simple 
ransomware, but rather a wiper worm (McKee and McFarland, 2017; Egloff, 2020) that irreversibly 
encrypted information at the computer’s master boot records (McKee and McFarland, 2017; EU 
Cyber Direct, 2017). Its original target was noted to be Ukraine, however, it affected sixty-four 
 
12 Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014 
13 Cybernetic intrusion of the Democrat National Committee in 2016 
14 NotPetya Case of 2017 
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countries, among them: the United States, Russia, and Brazil15 and caused what is estimated to be 
more than 10 billion dollars in damages worldwide (EU Cyber Direct, 2017). The program that was 
the initial springboard of the worm spread was the Ukrainian program M.E. Doc (EU Cyber Direct, 
2017; Ghosh, 2017) and was created utilizing an exploit, EternalBlue16, allegedly developed by the 
United States National Security Agency (NSA) (EU Cyber Direct, 2017; Grossman, 2017). 
Investigations in the following months by several institutions such as the CIA (Central 
Intelligence Agency) traced and attributed the NotPetya worm to Russia (Volz and Young, 2018; 
Nakashima, 2018). The public attribution and subsequent denouncing of Russia was done not only 
by Ukraine and the United States, but several countries such as Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, 
New Zealand17 (Egloff, 2020), Denmark, Lithuania, and Estonia blamed Russia (EU Cyber Direct, 
2017). The significance of this event is clear to see when looking at the widespread attribution, 
political momentum led to various countries to rally behind a flag with the United States not only 
enacting sanctions against Russia (BBC, 2018), but also indicting six Russian citizens who were 
allegedly behind the attack18. While it has not been at the same moment in time, the European 
Council came with a list of Sanctions against Russia for the NotPetya attack19.   
The use of public attribution and condemnation by the Five-Eyes Alliance provided 
momentum towards the molding of acceptable conduct within the space (Egloff, 2020). NotPetya 
became an emblematic case as not only did the attribution was so strong, but that it can be 
considered the start of customary law as sets precedent. The attributional factor, that impeded the 
localization of the source of action, made it nearly impossible to set such precedents before even 
when looking at the cases with cybercriminals and recreational hackers as their cases had no 
precedential value (Brown and Poellet, 2012). In itself, the NotPetya case coupled with the 
subsequent actions set a precedent, though it does also open a few debates of LOAC that are outside 
the scope of this paper, such as the status of civilian data of which is not covered by the Tallin Manual 
(Graboritz et. al., 2020).  
Both the United Kingdom and the United States have recognized the importance of public 
attribution and prudent examination of such cyber incidents as methods and tools to influence 
(Brown and Poellet, 2012; Egloff, 2020). Actions undertaken by States, can and are interpreted by 
the international community as signals, which point to the direction of where customary laws in 
cyberspace should take. However, it does not mean that there will be a hard codification of customary 
laws, as observations of decades of codification of customary laws have been rather mixed with 
 
15 https://www.businessinsider.com/petya-cyberattack-hit-64-countries-no-kill-switch-2017-6.  
16 EternalBlue created a backdoor into all Windows 8 and older Systems, allowing a Null Session that allowed 
the client to send commands to the infected server (Grossman, 2017). 
17 These five countries are part of what is called the Five-Eyes Alliance (Egloff, 2020). 
18 See: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA (United States). Criminal No. 20-
316. [S. l.], 15/10/2020. 
19 The sanctions were not simply against Russia due to NotPetya, but a host of different cyberattacks conducted 
by Russia and China. 
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various codifications taking different forms of merely restating customary laws in legislatively non-
binding language while others take forms of legislative binding treaties that have a lesser overall 
adherence (Bordin, 2014). 
Whichever would be the case for cyberspace customary laws, what is important to take away 
from this is the observation that public attribution in cyber incidents have taken on a normative 
function. This function seeks to create constraints that will become legally binding in various 
international forums, including international organizations as well as international courts. However 
long it might take, the political momentum expressed in the NotPetya case shows that there is a clear 
understanding on the role that international norms and regimes in regard to cyberspace will take, 
prompting highly influential States, such as the United States, and its allies to start releasing more 





As a domain that expanded itself exponentially vertically and horizontally, cyberspace has 
gained priority in the agenda of many States in the world, often to the point of becoming part of 
national security. Despite all this, there has not been a customary law that has been consistent in 
addressing cyber incidents between States in a diplomatic and legal fashion due to early issues 
regarding the nascent domain such as technical proving and lack of a procedural or criminal 
international law regarding unsavory acts conducted in this space. Though as this paper shows, 
during the three decades that cyberspace has existed many changes have been enacted, often leading 
to progress in the technological, legal and political field that now leave a fertile ground for the 
foundation of customary laws to be created. 
As a result of these changes, there will inevitably be an observation in the rise of public 
attribution of cyber incidents and States being condemned for not taking responsibility for 
destructive acts enacted by State agents or non-State actors residing in the accused States. 
Cyberspace, once an extremely unknown and grey domain, is starting to become a domain that is 
ordered and with certain laws to mediate conflicts in this dimension. The process, while nascent, is 




*Artigo recebido em 11 de dezembro de 2020,  
aprovado em 13 de abril de 2021. 
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